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DEVO-(WO) MAN? A MOVE
IN RESPECT OF PERSONAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND
DECISION-MAKING IN
5HEALTH CARE?
Anita Border v Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust
[2015] EWCACiv 8
JOANNE Q1BESWICK*
Law School, Staffordshire University, Leek Road, Stoke-on-Trent, Staffs ST4 2DE, UK
10*j.l.beswick@staffs.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
This case commentary discusses a recent case concerning the determination of acceptable
clinical practice. It critically examines two particular elements of the judgment—the
method for the determination of acceptable clinical practice including the impact (if any)
15of the Bolitho exception. It then moves on to considering the importance of consent as a
pre-requisite for medical treatment and the interplay of negligence and battery in this
area. It concludes by examining the possibility that the courts in England and Wales
might be entering an era of judicial assertiveness in the regulation of clinical practice.
KEYWORDS: Battery, Bolam test, consent to treatment, clinical negligence, standard
20of care
INTRODUCTION
The case of Border v Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust deals with the controversial
topic of exactly how assertive the courts will be in determining what constitutes rea-
sonable medical professional practice. This is in relation to both clinical decision-
25making and, more speciﬁcally, the clinical duty to ensure that in the case of competent
adult patients the patient’s consent is secured. This decision was an appeal from the
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court of ﬁrst instance where Moloney J dismissed the claimant’s case for clinical negli-
gence. Permission to appeal was granted on a single ground, the issue of the patient’s
consent. The events that gave rise to the claim took place in 2008, when the claimant,
30then aged 64, was admitted with a suspected broken right humerus to the Accident
and Emergency department, speciﬁcally the resuscitation room of the Queen Eliza-
beth Hospital in Woolwich. Dr Prenter was the senior house ofﬁcer on duty. On her
admission and examination, he had decided immediately to insert a cannula into the
claimant, as was standard practice. As the right arm was broken it was not a suitable
35site, ordinarily the left arm would have been the usual site, but in this case the claim-
ant had recently had a left mammectomy and axillary node clearance, which meant
that the arm was more susceptible to developing an infection and oedema. Mrs
Border had informed Dr Prenter both about the recent prior procedure and about her
reservations regarding the insertion of the cannula in this situation, as soon as the
40issue of insertion arose. Dr Prenter would have known exactly what Mrs Border was
referring to, when she informed him of the problem with her left arm as the risk of an
oedema after a mammectomy and axillary node clearance is one well understood by
Accident and Emergency doctors. Moloney J held that ‘there was an obviously cogent
reason’ to avoid the arm if a third site could be found.1 Notwithstanding this and
45despite the claimant’s attempts to alert him about her concerns, Dr Prenter proceeded
to insert the cannula into the left arm. Unfortunately the claimant did develop an
infection, which left her with a fairly serious permanent disability in her left arm. The
claim was brought in negligence alone, the focus of the case at ﬁrst instance being
whether Dr Prenter had acted in accordance with accepted medical practice in insert-
50ing the cannula when he did. There was little signiﬁcance given to the issue of
consent, which later assumed a central place in the appeal.
THE DETERMINATION OF ACCEPTABLE CLINICAL PRACTICE:
EXACTLY WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF THE BOLITHO EXCEPTION?
The ﬁrst point of reference when examining the way in which the law determines
55what is the appropriate standard of care in professional negligence actions is the direc-
tion which McNair J gave to the jury in the ﬁrst instance case of Bolam v Friern Hos-
pital Management Committee,2 and the subsequent decision of Bolitho v City and
Hackney HA.3 It has been clear for some time that it is only if the court sets the stand-
ard of care which should be achieved that the law retains its prescriptive power. If the
60courts defer too readily to expert evidence, the standard of medical care may decline Q2.4
Moloney J began by stating that a doctor would not be guilty of negligence where he
has acted in accordance with a responsible body of doctors skilled in that particular
branch of the profession ‘subject to the exception in Bolitho v City and Hackney HA5
where the relevant body of opinion is shown not to be capable of logical analysis’.6
1 Moloney J determined that the obvious site was her legs but heard that Dr Prenter had examined Mrs
Border’s legs and determined it would be difﬁcult to ﬁnd a suitable vein in her legs. [para 6].
2 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118.
3 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.
4 Andrew Grubb,Medical Law- Text with Materials, (3rd edn Butterworths 2000) p 425.
5 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232.
6 At para [3] of this judgment.
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65Lord Browne-Wilkinson who had given the only substantive speech in Bolitho had
held:
In the vast majority of cases the fact that distinguished experts in the ﬁeld are of
a particular opinion will demonstrate the reasonableness of the opinion . . . But
if in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not
70capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the
opinion is neither reasonable or responsible.
I emphasise that in my view, it will very seldom be right for a judge to reach the
conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreason-
able. The assessment of medical risks and beneﬁts is a matter of clinical judgment
75which a judge would not normally be able to make without expert evidence.7
Dr Prenter explained that the establishment of an IV line was a standard and import-
ant resuscitation room practice. There were two expert witnesses before Moloney J.:
Dr Evans for the claimant and Mr Hayworth for the defendant. On the basis of their
evidence, he found that both witnesses accepted that standard medical practice neces-
80sitated that an IV line should be established in the ‘early stage’. Moloney J further
accepted and relied upon Mr Hayworth’s evidence that he like Dr Prenter would have
inserted the IV into the left arm immediately. He went on to state that the logic of
this was clear in his opinion as ‘in an uncertain and potentially dangerous situation it
is better to be ready, even if there is a slight risk of an adverse known side effect’.8
85Moloney J noted that Dr Evans, the expert for the claimant, would have waited to see
how the situation developed before inserting the cannula but held that, although ‘a
highly experienced consultant’ like Dr Evans might have waited to see how the situ-
ation developed, it would have been a very bold decision for a Senior House Ofﬁcer
not to follow standard practice. This is a curious comment on two levels; ﬁrst, a lack
90of experience does not ordinarily justify a departure from the single standard of rea-
sonable care as in Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority.9 A single standard of care can
only be practicable by ‘relating the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct to the
task which is undertaken, and what is objectively reasonable does not change with the
experience of the defendant or the post he holds’.10 To ﬁnd otherwise would be to go
95against general principles of negligence, and to open up this area of law to abuse. It is
possible that Moloney J was instead ﬁnding that not to establish an IV line immedi-
ately (which was the course Dr Evans favoured) would have only been attempted
7 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 at pp. 243.
8 It would appear that the terminology of Bolitho has permeated the judicial consciousness. Although it is
suggested a more detailed risk/beneﬁt analysis could have been carried out. Therefore, Bolitho logic is sus-
ceptible to deference in the same way as the earlier Bolam adjectives.
9 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] 2 WLR 557. In the Court of Appeal, there had been some dis-
agreement as to the appropriate standard to apply in the case of the junior doctor. Although the majority
found that it was an objective standard with Glidewell J acutely aware of the dangers or permitting inexperi-
ence to be used as a defence to an action for negligence as noted by Michael JonesMedical Negligence (4th
ed Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 283.
10 Michael JonesMedical Negligence (4th ed Sweet and Maxwell 2008) 284.
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by an individual of unusual specialist skill in the manner of Defreitas v O’Brien.11 Also,
once Moloney J determined that Dr Prenter ‘was acting in the way which many,
100perhaps the great majority of doctors would have done’, he drew the conclusion that
Dr Prenter’s decision to insert the cannula was not negligent ‘even though it proved
not to be strictly necessary and to have serious consequences for the claimant’.12 It is
just this sort of reasoning—the equating of common practice with reasonable practice
without a thorough risk/beneﬁt analysis—which brought the Bolam test into disre-
105pute and subjected it to much academic criticism.13
Moloney J held that the reasoning of Dr Prenter and his expert Mr Hayworth with
regard to inserting the cannula into the left arm immediately was logical. He did not
ﬁnd that Dr Prenter’s decision was so ﬂawed as to bring it into the Hucks v Cole14
lacuna category. There the defendant had failed to treat a new mother suffering with
110an infected ﬁnger with penicillin, known to be a bacteriocidal, rather than tetracycline
which was not. The patient subsequently suffered puerpal Q3septicaemia and brought
proceedings in negligence. Two of the judges found that Dr Cole was negligent, but
neglected to elaborate. Sachs LJ was satisﬁed that if penicillin had been administered,
the infection would not have occurred and the patient would have avoided serious
115injury. He said that unless there was a good reason for not administering it:
the onset was due to a lacuna between what could easily have been done and
what was infact done. According to the defence, the lacuna was consistent with
and accorded with reasonable practice of others with obstetric experience.
When the evidence shows that a lacuna in professional practice exists by which
120risks of great danger are knowingly taken, then, however small the risks, the
courts must anxiously examine the lacuna—particularly if the risks can be easily
and inexpensively avoided. If the court ﬁnds on analysis of the reasons given for
not taking the precautions that, in the light of current professional knowledge,
there is no proper basis for that lacuna and it is deﬁnitely not reasonable that
125those risks should have been taken, its function is to state the fact and where
necessary to state that it constitutes negligence . . . On such occasions the fact
that other practitioners would have done the same thing as the defendant practi-
tioner is a very weighty matter to be put on the scales on his behalf but it is not
conclusive.
130Neither did Moloney J ﬁnd the decision in Marriot v West Midlands RHA15 as applic-
able to Mrs Border’s case. There the patient had been admitted to hospital following
11 DeFreitas v O’Brien [1995] 6 Med LR 108, although it seems an awkward analogy and most unlikely given
that the case was not even mentioned by Moloney J.
12 At paragraph [10] of [2015] EWCACiv 8.
13 Harvey Teff, ‘The Standard of Care in Medical Negligence—Moving on from Bolam’ [1998] 18 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 473, argued certain judicial applications of the Bolam test can convey the appear-
ance of automatically equating professional practice with expertise and identifying the reasonable doctor
with the ordinary doctor. If the courts defer too readily to expert evidence, the standard of medical care
may decline.
14 Hucks v Cole (1968) [1993] 4 Med LR 393.
15 Marriot v West Midlands RHA [1999] Lloyd’s Law Rep Med 23.
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an injury to his head and was discharged the following day after X-rays and neuro-
logical observations. He continued with headaches, lethargy, and loss of appetite, his
GP visited and advised the claimant’s wife to telephone him if the claimant deterio-
135rated and suggested analgesics for the headaches. Four days later the claimant’s condi-
tion deteriorated, and following emergency surgery to repair a skull fracture, he was
left paralysed with a speech disorder. Judge Alton found:
. . . a court must clearly be reluctant to depart from the view of an apparently
careful and prudent general practitioner, I have concluded that, if there was a
140body of professional opinion which supports the course of leaving the patient
who has some seven days previously sustained a head injury at home in circum-
stances where he continues to complain of headaches, drowsiness, etc., and
where there continues to be a risk of the existence of an intracranial lesion
which could cause a sudden and disastrous collapse, then such a view is not
145reasonably prudent.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant doctor’s appeal on the basis that the
judge was entitled to ﬁnd that it could not be a reasonable exercise of a GP’s discretion
to leave the patient at home rather than readmit to hospital. It could be submitted
that the decision by Dr Prenter in Mrs Border’s case, to insert the cannula immedi-
150ately without any consideration of the comparative risks and beneﬁts of the proposed
treatment, might not amount to a reasonable exercise of an A&E doctors discretion.16
It is perhaps more difﬁcult to assert that his decision fell within the Hucks v Cole17
lacuna category that risks of great danger were taken which could have been easily and
inexpensively avoided.18
155Following the Bolitho decision, there was much academic debate about its likely
impact. Brazier and Miola19 suggested there existed a prima facie presumption that
those outside the medical profession cannot understand the evidence, much less evalu-
ate it.20 They contended that it was a similar presumption that led to the way that
Bolam developed its tarnished image.21 Brazier and Miola22 contended that if Lord
160Browne-Wilkinson’s rare cases were to be interpreted by the ‘Dillon benchmark’,23
16 Moloney J at para [9] had stated ‘His choice really was simply: to use the left arm and make an immediate
insertion; or to “wait and see”: whether it would be necessary to use the left arm in a future moment if the
situation warranted it. There is no evidence before me that he gave any serious consideration to ‘wait and
see’. . .’
17 Hucks v Cole (1968) [1993] 4 Med LR 393.
18 Although on the facts as they actually transpired, there was a way in which the risks of cannula insertion
could have been easily avoided, simply not to insert one. However, there might have come a point where
the insertion was unavoidable and had that been the case there would not have been an alternative in the
Hucks v Cole sense.
19 Margaret Brazier and Jose Miola ‘Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (2000) 8 Medical Law
Review 85.
20 This idea of medical evidence being more complex and unsuitable for non-medical comprehension may be
inﬂuenced by social factors.
21 Brazier and Miola, No. 19.
22 Brazier and Miola, No. 19.
23 See the judgment of Dillon LJ in the Court of Appeal and his use of the public law concept of Wednesbury
unreasonableness. Bolitho (Deceased) v City and Hackney Health Authority [1993] 4 Med LR 381 CA.
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they might prove to be so rare as to be almost non-existent.24 It is contended that
Bolitho could go awry in the same way Bolam did. The adjective ‘logical’ does not
prevent prescriptive and descriptive standards becoming confused. Mulheron acknowl-
edged that it has already been judicially recognised that it will be difﬁcult to apply
165Bolitho where a distinguished expert in the ﬁeld considered the accused doctor’s treat-
ment or diagnosis to be a reasonable one.25 The post-Bolitho case law does provide
examples of the courts behaving assertively, when setting the standard of care in clinical
negligence.26 However, while less numerous, there are also decisions that deliver a
more explicitly cautious message as to the approach that will be taken.27 The concern
170raised by this later group of cases being Bolitho has done little to counter the most fun-
damental prohibitive inﬂuences that act on the judicial consciousness, i.e. concern as to
resource implications for the NHS, the entrenched ‘special’ respect for medical profes-
sionals, the persistence of viewing clinical negligence as ideologically distinct from
other forms of the tort including erroneous treatment of common practice via the mis-
175representation of Bolam. It is contended here that the decision in Border reiterates that
the adjective ‘logical’ does not prevent prescriptive and descriptive standards from
being potentially confused. Also, Moloney J’s reference to Dr Evans testimony as a
‘highly experienced’ consultant might be revisited here as possible evidence that the
old prohibitive inﬂuences do still impact upon the judicial consciousness when it
180comes to their acting assertively as the ultimate arbiters of the appropriate standard of
care.28 The Court of Appeal noted how Moloney J had: ‘accepted the implication of
Mr Hayworth’s evidence that he would have put the cannula into the left arm immedi-
ately, accepting the slight risk of the oedema as preferable to the unknown risk which
might occur in the near future’ without question.29 Furthermore, they were not pre-
185pared to ﬁnd that the running of a risk in order to avoid another as yet non-existent
risk was not logical. Reassuringly the Court of Appeal were emphatic that Moloney J
was wrong to regard consent as unimportant, but they unfortunately failed to question
his approach on the weight to be accorded to accepted medical practice.
24 Will they be as sporadic as the pre-Bolitho examples of the courts exercising such authority? Rachael Mul-
heron, ‘Trumping Bolam: A Critical Legal Analysis of Bolitho’s Gloss’ (2010) 69 Cambridge Law Journal
609, contended that on her analysis Bolitho’s ‘gloss’ had been invoked in over 20 decisions, and that was
not such a low view as to the termed ‘rare’.
25 My emphasis. Mulheron, No. 24, pp. 636 where she discussed the case of Wiszniewski v Central Manchester
HA [1998] EWCACiv 596 where the Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s ﬁnding for the claimant,
partly on the basis that the very eminence of the defendant’s experts rendered the Bolitho test difﬁcult to
satisfy.
26 Ian Leslie Marriott (by his next friend Gillian Patricia Marriott) v (1) West midlands Health Authority (2)
South east Staffordshire Area Health Authority (3) Surrendra Purshottam Patel [1999] Lloyd’s LR Med 23.
Also see Lowe v Havering Hospitals NHS Trust (2001) 62 BMLR 69. Signiﬁcantly neither of these cases
concerned disclosure of information but concerned clinical decisions.
27 Garcia v St Mary’s NHS Trust [2007] EWHC 3068 and the earlier decision of Wisniewski v Central Man-
chester Health Authority [1998] Lloyd’s Rep Med 223 CA, and more recently Ministry of Justice v Carter
[2010] EWCACiv 694.
28 Although Dr Evans was the expert who as not followed, deference was still evident both in Moloney J’s
description of that witness ‘a highly experienced consultant’ and his assertion that as Dr Prenter was
acting. In the way ‘which many perhaps the great majority of A&E doctors would have done’ he was not
negligent.
29 Para [10].
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THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSENT
190The claimant’s case on appeal was materially different to that which was argued
before Moloney J Counsel for the claimant focussed on Dr Prenter’s failure to gain
the claimant’s consent before inserting the cannula and how that was a breach of his
professional duty to take care of the claimant. Counsel for the defendant accepted
that both the paramountcy of patient autonomy and the principle that treatment
195without consent in the case of a competent adult should lead to a ﬁnding of breach of
the duty to take care in negligence but contended that in this instance the claimant
had impliedly consented to the procedure. Moreover, counsel for the defence con-
tended it was for the claimant to prove an absence of consent, yet Moloney J was not
asked to ﬁnd that treatment proceeded without her consent. Richards LJ found that
200Moloney J did not accept on the evidence before him that the patient had impliedly
consented to the insertion of the cannula by holding out her arm. He noted that refer-
ence to the transcript of the trial showed that there was a factual dispute between the
defendant and the claimant on this issue. The claimant asserted that Dr Prenter did
not discuss the issue and rather just stated, ‘I don’t have any choice’ before insertion
205of the cannula. Dr Prenter, on the other hand, claimed he had given her a substantial
explanation that insertion of the cannula was the safest option. Moloney J was clear
that he did not accept Dr Prenter’s evidence, that Mrs Border positively albeit
impliedly, consented to the treatment by holding out her arm in a co-operative
manner. Richards LJ refused to accept the respondent’s contention that Moloney J
210was wrong to prefer the claimant’s evidence on this issue given there was no basis for
the appellate court to interfere with the ﬁnding of fact.
Having made a ﬁnding of absence of consent, Moloney J took the issue no further,
as he appeared to be under the misapprehension that because this was occurring in
the resuscitation room that was the end of the matter.30 Richards LJ speculated that
215Moloney J might have had in mind the principle that in a medical emergency where
the patient is incapable of giving consent a doctor might proceed without consent
provided he is acting in the patient’s best interests as applicable to the situation before
him.31 However, the Court of Appeal was resoundingly clear that just because the
resuscitation room was an emergency setting, it did not automatically mean that the
220doctrine of necessity could be automatically utilised. The claimant in this case was
fully conscious and in the Court of Appeal’s view was capable of giving or withholding
her consent. This was a timely reminder, if one was needed, that the emergency
setting was not of particular relevance when dealing with a competent patient, and
certainly not to the extent that the doctrine of necessity could immediately circum-
225vent a competent adult patients right to decide whether to consent to or refuse a par-
ticular treatment. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal held that a ﬁnding of absence of
consent should have led Moloney J to ﬁnd that Dr Prenter had breached his duty of
care, notwithstanding the particulars of the claim at the trial. The Court of Appeal
emphasised that the duty to obtain a patient’s consent was a fundamental principle
230of medical practice. Richards LJ continued that this duty included informing the
30 Moloney J at para [7] ‘She hardly realised until, as she said, “Bang, it was done.” So he took the decision and
acted upon it in the conditions of the resuscitation room. That is not of itself a matter of great criticism’.
31 See for example St Georges’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1999] Fam 26.
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competent patient of the risks of treatment, thus allowing them to make an informed
decision about their own medical treatment. He cited with approval the judgment in
Chester v Afshar and held that breach of this duty to gain consent was established, but
noted that the issue of causation remained, and was best dealt with by the original
235trial judge.32 It is perhaps disappointing that the court took this view when the words
of Lord Hope are remembered:
The function of the law is to protect the patient’s right to choose. If it is to fulﬁl
that function it must ensure that the duty to inform is respected by the doctor.
It will fail to do this if an appropriate remedy cannot be given if the duty is brea-
240ched and the very risk which the patient should have been told about occurs
and she suffers injury.33
Counsel for the appellant sought permission to amend the particulars of the claim so
as to add a claim for trespass to the person as he submitted that the insertion of the
cannula was a technical battery. The Court of Appeal refused to allow the amendment
245which would have permitted them to consider the claim of trespass to the person.
That they should refuse this is of some concern despite the technicalities of the issue.
Although not made explicit, Moloney J did indeed ﬁnd a lack of consent from Mrs
Border, holding that he did not accept the defendant’s ‘suggestion that she laid out
her arm in a co-operative manner’ and that he preferred Mrs Border’s evidence, that
250she ‘hardly realised until after it was done’.34 Thus, having ruled that Mrs Border did
not consent either expressly or impliedly, and given that she was a competent adult,
what followed was prima facie a battery and not in accordance with the classic state-
ment from Cardozo J in Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital that:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
255what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an oper-
ation without an operation without his patients consent commits a battery.35
As Jones explains, the right to decline treatment exists ‘even where there are over-
whelming medical reasons in favour of the treatment . . .36’ Such a sentiment has been
repeated many times, as Jones again explains the Court of Appeal emphasised this
32 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41. Also see Sarah Devaney ‘Autonomy Rules Ok’ (2005) 13 Medical Law
Review 102 who asserted that it was the Lords decision in this case which ‘gave legitimacy to assertions that
the law in England . . . requires patients to be properly informed about proposed treatment, a claim which
until now had little weight’.
33 [2004] UKHL 41 at [56]. It is argued here that the duty to gain consent was breached in a most explicit
way in Mrs Borders case as she was actively voicing concerns about the proposed treatment and there was
no evidence of any serious attempt being made to counsel her as to the consequences of her refusal but
instead her decision was ignored.
34 Para 10.
35 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 N.Y. 125 at 126.
36 Jones, No. 9, pp. 551.
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260notwithstanding the countervailing interest of saving human life in St George’s Health-
care NHS Trust v S:
When human life is a stake the pressure to provide an afﬁrmative answer authoris-
ing unwanted medical intervention is very powerful. Nevertheless the autonomy
of each individual requires continuing protection even, perhaps particularly when
265the motive for interfering with it is readily understandable, and indeed to many
would appear commendable37
As Jones contends, it is not completely clear cut where the burden of proof rests in
the battery action.38 Although Freeman v The Home Ofﬁce39 challenged the traditional
view that consent operated as a defence to a battery when the court held the claimant
270had the burden of proof.40 There is a wealth of authority which categorises consent as
a defence, and if that is actually its correct categorisation, it should be for the defend-
ant to prove that the claimant consented.41 Jones further points out that in Canada42
and Australia43 consent is undoubtedly regarded as a defence.44 There is some Canad-
ian authority, which although tenuous could perhaps have been utilised by a court
275who were minded, not only to send a strong message on the importance of consent,
but who were also minded to provide an aggrieved patient with effective redress. In
Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital45 with facts strangely reminiscent of the current
case: the claimant gave an anaesthetist speciﬁc instructions not to touch her left arm
as she had experienced problems with doctors who had tried to ﬁnd a vein there in
280the past. The defendant replied that he knew what he was doing and proceeded to
administer the anaesthetic by needle into her left arm. During the surgery the anaes-
thesia leaked into the tissues interstitially, instead of through the vein causing the
37 Michael Jones, No. 9, pp. 552, the Court of Appeal emphasised this notwithstanding the countervailing
interests; see St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S ; R v Collins and others ex. parte S [1999] Fam 26.
38 Jones, No. 9, pp. 558.
39 Freeman v Home Ofﬁce [1984] QB 524.
40 As Jones, No. 9, pp. 559, explains Sir Anthony Clarke M.R in Ashley v Chief Constable of Sussex [2006]
EWCA Civ 1085 commented that ‘it is open to debate whether McCowan J’s conclusion in [Freeman v
The Home Ofﬁce] on the burden of proof is correct’.
41 Jones, No. 9, pp. 558.
42 Beausoleil v La Communaute des Soeurs de la Charite de la Providence (1964) 53 DLR (2D) 65.
43 Secretary Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (1992) 106 ALR 835 at 453, HC of Aus
where Jones, No. 9, pp. 559, explained McHugh J observed ‘The essential element of the tort is an inten-
tional or reckless direct act of the defendant which makes or has the effect of causing contact with the
body of the claimant. Consent may make the act lawful, but, if there is no evidence on the issue, the tort is
made out. The contrary view is inconsistent with a person’s right to bodily integrity. Other persons do not
have the right to interfere with an individual’s body unless he or she proves lack of consent to the interfer-
ence’. More recently in Dean v Phung [2012] NSWCA where the plaintiff alleged that the primary judge
had not adequately addressed the issue of trespass to the person. On appeal Basten LJ held ‘the burden of
proof will lie on the practitioner to establish the existence of a valid consent where that is in issue’. The
case itself concerned a dentist and there was a suggestion of possible fraud, but it is contended that the
statement of law could be more widely applicable.
44 Jones, No. 9, pp. 559.
45 Allan v New Mount Sinai (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634.
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patient to suffer a severe, unexpected reaction. Linden J held the defendant liable in
battery:
285Without consent, either written or oral, no surgery may be performed. That is not
a mere formality; it is an important individual right to have control over one’s
body, even where medical treatment is involved. It is the patient, and not the
doctor, who decides whether surgery will be performed, where it will be done. . .46
The High Court of Ontario held that although the doctor was not negligent he was
290liable in battery.47 As Jones48 explained, Linden J in a later case49 citing Reibl v
Hughes50 held ‘that the law of battery remains available where there is no consent to
the operation’.
A NEW ERA OF JUDICIAL ASSERTIVENESS?
That the Court of Appeal found for the claimant at all is notable given the poor
295record which contested clinical negligence cases have, particularly in front of the
higher courts.51 As even where the decision is received by academics as an assertive
one the end result is often still the same, the claimant loses.52 For example, it has
been asserted that the rhetoric of Bolitho did not match the outcome.53 The following
questions have been posed on numerous occasions; why is it that the medical profes-
300sions have been treated differently in comparison with other professions? Why was it
that plaintiffs fared so poorly? There are many complex reasons in answer to those
questions. Does the Court of Appeal’s ﬁnding for Mrs Border indicate a move for-
wards given that the Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health
Board54 has subsequently determined that
46 (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634 at 642.
47 (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634; rev’d on a pleading point (1982) 125 DLR (3d).
48 Jones, No. 9, pp. 554.
49 White v Turner (1981) 120 DLR (3d) 269 282 Ont HC, aff’d (1982) 12 DLR (4th) 319, Ont CA.
50 Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1 SCC.
51 Michael Jones expressed the state of play as a football score. In medical negligence claims before the
House of Lords between 1980 and 1999, the score stood at Plaintiffs 0 Defendants 6: see M Jones ‘The
Bolam Test and the Responsible Expert’ [1999] Tort Law Review 226. It is acknowledged that to a certain
extent cases such as Chester v Afshar [2004] 4 All ER 587 could have been seen as representing a change in
judicial attitudes. Sarah Devaney contended in ‘Autonomy Rules Ok’ (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 102
that the decision of the House of Lords by a majority of three to two was a notable victory for Miss
Chester. Also more recently Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, it is perhaps note-
worthy that both of these pro-claimant decisions are focussed on the information disclosure aspect of a
doctor’s duty. However, as Rob Heywood noted in ‘The Logic of Bolitho’ (2006) Professional Negligence
225 ‘the main concern. . .is Bolitho only works if the courts are actually prepared to engage in a thorough
examination of medical evidence rather than just saying they will’.
52 For a notable example of such a case, it is suggested that Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority
[1998] AC 232 could be examined.
53 Rob Heywood, No. 51 where he invited examination of the two treatment options available; to intubate or
not to. He asserted ‘something does not quite add up’. Intubation is a procedure, which undoubtedly
carries risks, but it confers the beneﬁt of preventing the greatest catastrophe of all, death. Any analysis of
the two options must lead to the conclusion that the decision not to intubate was ‘illogical’ in the circum-
stances. The judges did not accept this and the Health Authority avoided liability.
54 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [87].
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305[a]n adult person of sound mind is entitled which, if any, of the available forms
of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment
interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor is therefore
under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any
material risks involved in the recommended treatment and of any reasonable
310alternatives or variant treatments.
It remains to be seen for certain whether this year could really see the end of the
old sentiment of doctor (automatically) knowing best. In the case of Mrs Border at
least, she is yet to succeed in her claim, if success is measured by the award of
damages. If Montgomery is followed to its logical conclusion does this mean not only
315that there will have been a fundamental change in the law for information disclosure
cases55 but also that Bolam with all its various adjectives (reasonable, responsible,
logical) will never quite be the same again? Moreover, whether a medical practice is
of the acceptable standard of care must ultimately (in the case of competent adults at
least) require consideration of the patient’s views in concert with the professionals.
320Jackson LJ recently predicted that the attacks on Bolam would continue and possibly
succeed and that ‘if that happens, the court will set the standards for professional
persons in the same way that it sets the standards for everybody else, paying due
regard to any relevant evidence of practice and any relevant expert evidence’.56 It is
respectfully contended that such practice need not be seen as an attack on Bolam but
325rather a return to its intended function. Although the Court of Appeals treatment of
Mrs Border’s case57 means that doubts as to exactly when this will fully occur remain.
No ethical approval was required for this work.
Conﬂict of interest statement. None declared.
55 It could be argued that Montgomery only brings the law in line with existing professional practice. Fiona
Godlee, ‘New Rules of Consent; The Patient Decides’ (2015) 350 British Medical Journal 1534 explains, as
the Royal College of Surgeons ‘recent report Good Surgical Practices emphasises the importance of collab-
oration and shared decision making’. Moreover, that the therapeutic privilege should have been left in
place at all [85] sends a mixed message.
56 Nick Holborne, Jackson: ‘Professional Negligence’ could disappear as attitudes to the professionals change
Legal Futures. <http:www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/jackson-professional-negligence-could-disappear-
as-attitudes-change> accessed 29 April 2015.
57 It is noted that Border v Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust [2015] EWCA Civ 8 heard 16/12/14 with
judgment 21/1/15 predates the Supreme Court decision in Montgomery delivered on the 11th of March
2015 if not the hearing of 22nd and 23rd July 2014 the exact signiﬁcance of this is uncertain.
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